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1. Introduction 
Corruption, be it at the political or bureaucratic level, has become an issue of great 
interest recently, as it is believed to be a major barrier against development.1 Previous studies 
have found that corruption curbs growth and investment (Mauro, 2005), along with the provision 
of public services (Mauro, 1998), in addition to increasing inequality (Li et al., 2000). Because 
corruption is a reflection of institutional quality, it could also affect the choice of institutions 
themselves. The purpose of this paper, then, is to determine the impact of corruption on the 
choice of electoral system made by new democracies. 
A country’s electoral system has been found to affect corruption. On the one hand, 
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2003) argue that proportional representation (PR) systems with 
multimember districts are more prone to rent-seeking than plurality rule with small districts.2 
This is because in PR systems, voters are choosing among party lists, so that a politician’s 
chance of reelection is based not on performance, but on his or her rank on the list. On the other 
hand, in majoritarian and plurality systems, voters are choosing among individual candidates, 
which creates an incentive for incumbents to perform well.3 Myerson (1993), however, suggests 
that it is single-member district plurality systems that are more corrupt. In particular, because 
only one candidate can win the election, it raises the barriers to entry and makes it harder to 
remove a corrupt politician from office. In large district PR systems, on the other hand, 
competition drives corruption to zero. This is because in PR systems with large districts, where 
                                                
1 According to the Global Corruption Barometer survey, a majority of people in 48 out of 68 countries surveyed 
believe that corruption has worsened over the past 3 years, with political parties being rated the most corrupt 
(Hutchinson et al., 2005). 
2 Empirically, Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that proportional 
systems are more corrupt than majoritarian ones.  
3 Similarly, Persson and Tabellini (2000) argue that in majoritarian systems (which they define as plurality with 
several small districts), politicians must pay attention to voters in the marginal districts, leading to less public good 
provision than in proportional systems (defined as PR with one large district). On the other hand, since voters in 
these marginal districts are mobile, they are more likely to punish politicians for any wasteful spending, leading to 
less rents. 
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many candidates can be elected, it is possible to find an honest candidate for every ideological 
position, so that corrupt candidates are less likely to be elected. Other authors have found support 
for this barriers-to-entry argument. In particular, Persson and Tabellini (2003), as well as 
Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) find that the lower the district magnitude (that is, the 
smaller number of seats per district), the higher is corruption.  
This implies that if the type of electoral system affects corruption, then electoral rules 
could be chosen to maximize opportunities for corruption. To put it differently, as Aghion et al. 
(2005) point out, because those who write constitutions have at least some knowledge of how 
benefits would be distributed under alternative rules, the electoral system may not be exogenous. 
Following this reasoning, if one system provides more opportunities for corruption, and this is 
known by those drafting the constitution, does it mean, then, that countries where corruption is 
more widespread tend to favor one electoral system over another?  
Electoral rules have not changed much over time, as there are very few instances where 
countries with PR systems switched to majoritarian systems or vice versa. However, in the late 
80s and early 90s several countries became democratic, which prompted the writing of new 
constitutions. Although other authors have recognized the endogeneity of constitutional rules, to 
the best of my knowledge no one has yet examined whether the level of corruption affects the 
choice of electoral rule made by new democracies. Some authors, however, have explored how 
electoral rules are shaped in the first place. Aghion et al. (2005) look at the choice of electoral 
rules in the context of minority representation in U.S. cities. They show that when the size of the 
minority is small, majorities adopt at-large elections. As the minority becomes larger, however, 
the majority switches the electoral rule to single-member districts. Boix (1999) explores the 
choice of electoral rules in various countries. He argues that when the voting franchise was 
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extended, it mostly increased the number of left-wing voters. Plurality systems persisted in 
countries where socialist parties were weak or dominated by the established, non-socialist 
parties. If the entry of left-wing voters caused the socialist party to be strong, however, then a PR 
system would be adopted. Aghion et al. (2004) examine the relationship between how polarized 
a society is, and how insulated its leaders are. When measuring insulation as the type of electoral 
rule (the more proportional being the less insulated), the authors find that an increase in 
polarization increases the likelihood that plurality will be chosen. Clearly, then, a link between 
the level of corruption and the type of electoral rule that is selected may in fact exist. This 
question is important because if constitutions in newly democratic countries are being written in 
a way that perpetuates corruption, then these countries are in effect undermining their own 
development potential. 
The analysis, then, exploits the variation from countries that adopted an electoral system 
during the 80s and 90s to identify the effect of corruption on the choice of electoral rule. Some of 
these countries were dictatorships that also undertook elections, so that the electoral system was 
potentially unchanged once the country democratized.4 Other countries were democracies that 
changed their electoral system.5 A further subset of countries remained autocratic but adopted an 
electoral system. In the end, there were 50 instances where an electoral system was adopted as 
opposed to merely changed during the 1984 to 2004 period, with 29 of the cases resulting from 
democratization (see Appendix 1). As seen in Table 1, the average initial perceived level of 
corruption for countries that adopted a PR system, measured using the 1984 International 
                                                
4 For example, in Brazil, from 1975 to 1985 (during the military rule), the President was elected by an electoral 
college, made up of the elected National Assembly and an appointed body of state representatives (Keefer 2002). 
5 For instance, New Zealand moved from plurality to a mixed system in 1993. One nondemocratic country that 
changed its electoral system once it democratized was Poland, which changed from plurality to PR. 
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Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index,6 is 3.06, with 6 being the most corrupt. For 
countries that chose a mixed system, the initial level of corruption was 3.45 on average; for those 
that selected a plurality or majoritarian system, the average initial level of corruption was 4.11.7 
This means that countries that selected a PR system appear to have started with lower corruption 
levels than countries that ultimately selected other electoral systems.  
Using different measures of the electoral system, this paper finds that countries that start 
out more corrupt are more likely to adopt a plurality system. Given that most countries in the 
sample with a plurality system also have single-member districts,8 this finding possibly supports 
Myerson’s (1993) result that plurality systems, as a result of barriers to entry, are more 
conducive to corruption than PR systems. Results are robust throughout different specifications.  
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data, while 
Section 3 presents the empirical specification. Section 4 examines the results and subjects them 
to a variety of sensitivity tests. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Electoral System 
Persson and Tabellini (2004) argue that electoral systems can differ in terms of district 
magnitude, electoral formula, and ballot structure. District magnitude determines the number of 
representatives that obtain seats; the electoral formula translates votes into seats, and the ballot 
                                                
6 The ICRG index has been produced annually since 1982 by Political Risk Services, a private international 
investment risk service. It measures corruption at all levels of government and bureaucracy, and is based on the 
opinion of experts, and seeks to capture the extent to which “high government officials are likely to demand special 
payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout low levels of government in the form of “bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.” 
7 Using a broader sample of countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find no systematic difference in corruption 
levels across the different types of electoral systems. This is possibly due to the inclusion of countries that already 
had a particular electoral system. 
8 The average number of districts for the countries in the sample with a plurality system is 207.2, with an average 
district size of 4.4 seats, whereas for those with a PR system it is 14.9, with an average district size of 29.8. 
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structure determines how voters cast ballots. Such a distinction suggests three broad measures of 
a country’s electoral system. The first one is an indicator for the country’s electoral formula, 
which may take three broad forms. Two related types are plurality and majoritarian rule. Under 
the former, the candidate who wins the most votes in the district is elected. Under the latter, a 
candidate is elected only when he or she wins a majority of votes in the district. Another 
possibility is proportional representation, or PR. In this case, candidates are elected depending on 
the votes received by their parties. A final possibility is a mixed system, in which plurality and 
proportional representation are combined.  
The second indicator is the effective threshold of representation, as developed by 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Lijphart (1994). It measures the degree of proportionality in 
the system, or the share of votes that guarantees representation to any party with a 50 percent 
probability under each electoral rule. The higher the threshold, the lower the degree of 
proportionality, and thus the higher the barriers to entry. The third measure is the average district 
magnitude, defined as the average number of seats per district.  
 
2.1.1. Electoral System 
The first indicator of a country’s electoral system is taken from the World Bank’s 
Database on Political Institutions (DPI2004), as described by Keefer (2005). The database 
contains data on the type of electoral system from 1976 to 2004. The variable PLURALITY 
takes a value of 1 if legislators are elected using a winner-take-all (majoritarian) or first-past-the-
post (plurality) rule and 0 if it is not. The variable is further coded NA if “there is no competition 
for seats in a one-party state or if legislators are appointed” and is left blank “if it is unclear 
whether there is competition in a one-party state.” The variable PR, for its part, has a value of 1 
 7 
if the country has a proportional representation system, and 0 otherwise, unless there is only one 
party, one candidate, the legislature is not elected, or there is no legislature, in which case the 
variable takes a value of NA. 
 
From these indicators, I constructed two different measures.9 The first distinguishes 
between plurality (or majoritarian) and another type of regime (PR or mixed). The resulting 
dependent variable then takes a value of 1 (plurality) if the variable PLURALITY in the 
DPI2004 is 1 and the variable PR is not equal to 1; and 0 otherwise.  
The next measure further distinguishes between PR and mixed systems. The dependent 
variable this time takes a value of 0 if the country has a PR system (that is, if the variable PR in the 
DPI2004 dataset equals 1 and PLURALITY does not equal 1). If the country has a mixed system, 
denoted in the DPI2004 dataset as both PR and PLURALITY having a value of 1, the dependent 
variable also takes a value of 1. If the country has a plurality system, so that the variable 
PLURALITY equals 1 and PR does not equal 1, the dependent variable takes a value of 2.  
 
2.1.2. Effective Threshold and District Magnitude 
The second measure included in the analysis as the dependent variable is the effective 
threshold, as defined by Lijphart (1994). It is defined as the level of support that, for each type of 
electoral rule, guarantees parliamentary representation to any party, with a probability of at least 
50 percent. The effective threshold at the district level is calculated as the average of the 
threshold of exclusion and the threshold of inclusion. The threshold of exclusion is the maximum 
                                                
9 Because of inconsistencies in the DPI2004 dataset, I changed the index in the following cases, as the electoral rule 
given did not match that in Reynolds et al. (2005): Chile (plurality in the DPI2004 dataset, changed to PR), and 
Czech Republic and Guatemala (mixed in the DPI2004, changed to PR). I also coded the electoral system for 
Nigeria, as the DPI2004 dataset included data on district magnitude but not on the electoral system. 
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percentage of the vote that, under the most unfavorable conditions, such as having an opposition 
party gain all the remaining vote, is still insufficient to gain representation. As for the threshold 
of inclusion, it is the minimum percentage of votes that gives a party a seat when the rest of the 
parties are extremely fragmented. For instance, in the case of a single member plurality system 
with 4 candidates competing for a seat, the threshold of exclusion is 50 percent, while the 
threshold of inclusion is 25 percent, so that any candidate who gets a higher share than that wins 
the seat if the other 3 candidates split the vote. The effective threshold here is then 37.5. 
District magnitude, however, can vary within a country. For instance, Ireland has districts 
with 3, 4, or 5 seats. Because I am interested in the effective threshold at the national level, I use 
an approximation from Lijphart (1999). In particular,  
Effthresh =
75%
M +1
         (1) 
where M is the average district magnitude, which is taken from DPI2004. This variable is 
defined as the mean district magnitude in the lower chamber, measured as the weighted average 
of the number of representatives elected by each electoral district.  
The higher the effective threshold, the higher the barriers to entry, and hence the less 
proportional is the electoral system. Therefore, PR systems tend to have low effective thresholds, 
whereas plurality systems have high thresholds. For example, a country with single-seat electoral 
districts such as the United States would have an effective threshold of 37.5 percent, while 
Ireland, with an average district magnitude of 4-seats, has an effective threshold of 15 percent. 
The final measure of the dependent variable used in this paper is M, the average district 
magnitude, which defined as the average number of seats per district. The smaller the number of 
seats in a district on average, the smaller is the district, and hence the larger is the number of 
districts, which suggests a less proportional system.  
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2.1.3. Additional Measures of Dependent Variable 
To ensure robustness of the results, I construct similar measures using data from Golder 
(2005). In particular, from the indicator ELECSYSTEM_TYPE, which differentiates between 
majoritarian, PR, multi-tier (where PR or majoritarian is used in several electoral tiers),10 and 
mixed systems, I construct a measure distinguishing between plurality, PR, and mixed. The 
resulting dependent variable then takes a value of 0 if the country has a PR system, 1 if it has a 
mixed system, and 2 if plurality.  
To calculate the effective threshold measure, which is the second form of the dependent 
variable, I use a measure of the average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier as M in 
equation (1). The correlation between the two different measures of M from DPI2004 and Golder 
(2005) is 0.463. The third form of the dependent variable is then the Golder (2005) measure of 
M, which is defined as the average district magnitude. 
 
2.2. Corruption 
There exists no objective measure of corruption, so since Mauro (1995), a number of 
empirical studies have employed various subjective indices that attempt to measure the perceived 
levels of corruption in a country. There have been arguments, however, that such corruption 
perception indices are more a measure of institutional quality than actual corruption. Mocan 
(2004), for instance, uses the United Nation’s International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) to 
construct a measure of actual corruption. After controlling for institutional quality, he finds that 
the extent of actual corruption does not have a significant effect on perceptions of corruption. 
The ICVS survey, however, only asks a sample of households whether “any government official 
                                                
10 The author notes that only Mauritius and Papua New Guinea have majoritarian multi-tier system. Because neither 
country is part of the sample, I regard all multi-tier systems as PR. 
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asked or expected a bribe for services.”11 On the other hand, the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) corruption index, which is the index used in this paper, is more concerned with 
“actual or potential corruption in form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favor-
for-favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business,” in 
addition to financial corruption. 12 Clearly the question asked by the ICVS survey does not 
address these forms of corruption. Furthermore, given that such indices are used by banks and 
multinationals in making investment decisions, they are important in predicting a country’s 
economic performance. 
The ICRG index provides an appraisal of corruption within the political system. As 
mentioned in the introduction, it is based on the opinion of experts. The aim is to provide 
potential investors with an assessment of the likelihood of a government overthrow or a 
breakdown in law and order. The index varies from 0 to 6, with higher values denoting less 
corruption. The data are provided on a monthly basis, so I construct a simple annual average, 
which makes the index continuous between 0 and 6. For ease of interpretation, I reverse the 
index so that high values correspond to high corruption levels.  
One advantage of the ICRG index over other available indices is the fact that it is 
available starting in 1984 and for a large sample of countries. It is also highly correlated to other 
indices that have been used in the literature, such as Transparency International and Business 
International (see Treisman, 2000, for more details), which suggests that they are consistent 
despite being a subjective rating.  
One problem, however, is that using the time-varying country-specific corruption 
indicator would create an endogeneity problem, as the electoral system adopted could affect 
                                                
11 http://www.unicri.it/icvs  
12 http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods 
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subsequent corruption. As mentioned in the introduction, Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003), 
among others, have found that PR systems are more corrupt. Furthermore, the concern of this 
paper is to determine the impact of the corruption level on the choice of electoral system. This 
means that I am interested in how corrupt a country was at the time of selection, not afterwards. 
Therefore, the first available year of the corruption indicator is used to explain the type of 
government subsequently chosen. This then allows me to examine the effect of a country’s initial 
corruption level on the choice of electoral rule. 
 
2.3. Controls 
As mentioned in the introduction, the choice of electoral rule depends on the degree of 
polarization. Aghion et al. (2004) argue that the more polarized a society is, the more insulated 
will be the electoral rule chosen. The authors find empirical support for this theory, as greater 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization increases the likelihood that plurality will be chosen. A time-
invariant indicator of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985, taken from Roeder (2001), is then 
used to measure the degree of polarization in each country.  
I further include controls for the log of population and the initial log of real GDP per 
capita, as in Aghion et al. (2005) and Blais and Massicotte (1997). Both are taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Larger countries are predicted to be more likely to 
adopt plurality, especially those with small district sizes, as such a system makes it easier for 
constituents to be reached during campaigns. As for real GDP per capita, its impact on the choice 
of electoral rules is unclear. In fact, Blais and Massicotte (1997) find that the level of economic 
development has no impact on the electoral system chosen. However, since higher economic 
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development is associated with democratization, I follow Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) and include 
the initial log of real GDP per capita as a control variable. 
Furthermore, as in Aghion et al. (2004), dummies for a country’s colonial origin are also 
included. In particular, former colonies are distinguished for having a British or French colonial 
origin. Foreign powers oftentimes imposed their own institutions upon their colonies, increasing 
the likelihood that the colony would merely continue using the same system after independence. 
Former British colonies, for instance, have been found to be more likely to adopt plurality rule 
(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Persson and Tabellini, 2004). Only British and French colonial 
origin are included because the two controlled the largest number of countries for the longest 
period of time, and tended to introduce institutions in them (Blais and Massicotte, 1997). 
Alternatively, controls for legislative origin are included to explain the choice of electoral 
system. More specifically, indicators are included for British and Socialist legal origin.13 
Socialist legal origin denotes countries that emerged from Soviet influence, and they mostly 
adopted a PR or mixed system. Some of them started out with a plurality system, whereas others 
had no electoral system. The effect of British legal origin, or common law origin, is hypothesized 
to be similar to that of British colonial origin. 
I also experiment with adding dummies for continental location (Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America and Caribbean) to account for the fact that some electoral rules are more common in 
one region than in another. 
Summary statistics, by electoral rule, are presented in Table 1. As mentioned in the 
introduction, it is seen that initial corruption is highest in countries that adopt a plurality system. 
                                                
13 Aghion et al. (2004) also include other legal origin (such as Scandinavian), but no country in the sample belonged 
to this category. 
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In addition, plurality systems have the lowest log of GDP per capita, while no country with 
British colonial or legal origin adopted a mixed system. 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
Countries that changed the electoral system during the period under consideration fall 
into two categories: those that moved from autocracy to democracy and those that adopted an 
electoral system without changing the regime. In the baseline case, the electoral system takes a 
value of 1 if plurality and 0 if PR or mixed. The estimated model is then a probit, with the 
probability that a country i will select plurality given by  
yi
!
= "
1
CORRUPTIONi + "2CONTROLi +#i       (2) 
where 
yi =
0  if yi
*= PR/mixed
1  if yi
*= plurality
!
"
#
$#
        (3) 
and 
! 
X
i
 is a vector of country i’s characteristics. These characteristics include the 1984 ICRG 
corruption perception index, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, log of population, initial 
log of real GDP per capita, either colonial or legal origin, and the regional dummies.  
In the next instance, the electoral system is further distinguished between PR, mixed, and 
plurality. There are two possible ways of estimating the relationship between corruption and the 
electoral system in this case. If one believes the different types of systems belong to unordered 
categories, the model can be estimated using a multinomial logit (MNL). The probability that a 
country i will select electoral rule j is then given by: 
Prob ELECSYSi = j( ) =
exp !" j Xi( )
exp !"k Xi( )
k=0
n
#
      (4) 
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where 
! 
X
i
 is a vector of country i’s characteristics, which are as described above. Assuming 
! 
"
0
= 
0, to solve the indeterminacy in the model, equation (4) can be normalized into 
Prob ELECSYSit = j( ) =
exp !" j Xi( )
1+ exp !"k Xi( )
k=1
n
#
      (5) 
Prob ELECSYS
it
= 0( ) =
1
exp !"
k
X
i( )
k=1
n
#
      (6) 
A restriction of the MNL model is that it requires that the relative probabilities for any 
two alternatives are unchanged if another alternative is added or if the characteristics of the third 
alternative are changed. This independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption can be 
tested using the McFadden-Hausman test (see, Wooldridge, 2002, for instance). Tests for IIA are 
performed in all cases and the assumption is always found to hold. 
The different electoral rules categories can also be considered as ordered. This is because 
they can be ranked from lowest (PR) to highest (plurality) barriers to entry. To take this ranking 
into account, I also estimate an ordered probit model of the same form as (3), only this time  
yi =
0  if yi
*= PR
1  if yi
*= mixed
2  if yi
*= plurality
!
"
#
$
#
        (7) 
Because coefficients on ordered probit models are difficult to interpret, in that the sign on 
the coefficients does not always determine the effect of the regressors on the intermediate 
category (in this case mixed),14 I also report the marginal effects of changes in the regressors, 
evaluated at the mean of the respective explanatory variables. The marginal effects then provide 
                                                
14 Note that in ordered probit, the sign of the coefficient will be the same as the effect on the highest category of the 
dependent variable (in this case plurality), but the opposite of the effect on the lowest category (in this case PR). The 
direction of the marginal effect on the remaining category (mixed) cannot be inferred from the coefficient. See 
Wooldridge (2002). 
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the response probability P y = j x( ) , where x is the vector of control variables and the corruption 
index. 
Next, the electoral system is measured using the effective threshold. The higher the 
effective threshold, the less proportional is the electoral system and thus the greater the barriers 
to entry. The estimated equation is: 
EFFTHRESH
i
= !
1
+ !
2
CORRUPT
i
+ !
2
CONTROL
i
+"
i
       (4) 
whereEFFTHRESH
i
 is the effective threshold in country i, measured as indicated in equation 
(1);15 
! 
CORRUPT
i
 is the 1984 ICRG corruption perception index; 
! 
CONTROL
i
 is the same vector 
of control variables as above; and !
i
 is the error term.  
The final equation estimates the effect of initial corruption on the subsequent choice of 
district magnitude. The estimated equation is: 
DISTRICT
i
= !
1
+ !
2
CORRUPT
i
+ !
2
CONTROL
i
+"
i
     (5) 
whereDISTRICT
i
 is the average district size in country i and the other terms are as described 
above.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Autocratic and Democratizing Countries that Adopted an Electoral System 
Baseline probit regressions estimating how likely a country is to adopt a plurality system 
versus PR/mixed are shown in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 include colonial origin dummies as 
controls, whereas columns 3 and 4 add legal origin dummies instead. The results indicate that 
more corrupt countries are in fact more likely to have plurality systems, regardless of the set of 
                                                
15 Data to calculate the effective threshold (and hence the average district magnitude) is not available for Vietnam 
and Uzbekistan. 
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controls. Both French and British colonial origin are found to increase the likelihood of adopting 
plurality, though not when regional dummies are included. The effect of real GDP per capita is 
similarly only significant in column 3, where it is found that higher levels reduce the likelihood 
of adopting plurality. The same is found regarding socialist legal origin, though again, it is only 
significant in one specification.  
Table 3 distinguishes electoral systems between plurality, PR, and mixed, and estimates 
the regressions using a multinomial logit. The results, however, are unchanged. More corrupt 
countries still seem more likely to adopt a plurality system over PR, regardless of specification. 
They are also more likely to adopt a mixed system. Greater ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
decreases the log odds of adopting a mixed system over PR, but it is significant in only one 
specification. British colonial origin reduces the likelihood of a mixed system, as does British 
legal origin. Furthermore, Socialist legal origin increases the log odds of adopting a mixed 
system, while French colonial origin increases the probability of selecting plurality rule. Finally, 
the log of population also increases the likelihood of a mixed system, as well as plurality, though 
only in one specification.  
Table 4 takes advantage of the fact the relationship between corruption and the electoral 
system can be estimated as an ordered probit model. As mentioned in section 3, this is because 
the electoral rule can be ranked from lowest (PR) to highest (plurality) barriers to entry. As 
before, columns 1 and 2 include colonial origin dummies as controls, whereas columns 3 and 4 
have legal origin dummies. The results, however, are unchanged. More corrupt countries still 
seem more likely to adopt a plurality system regardless of specification, perhaps because the 
barriers to entry argument outweighs the benefits of greater transparency.  
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As discussed in section 3, because coefficients on ordered probit models are difficult to 
interpret, in that the sign of the coefficients cannot determine the sign of the intermediate 
category (in this case mixed), the bottom panel of Table 4 reports marginal effects of changes in 
the regressors, evaluated at the mean of the respective explanatory variables. They indicate that 
higher corruption reduces the probability of adopting a PR or a mixed system, and raises that of 
selecting a plurality rule. As before, French colonial origin increases the likelihood of adopting 
plurality, while British legal origin and the log of GDP per capita reduce the probability of 
plurality, though only in one specification. Furthermore, the effect of country size, measured as 
the log of population, is significant in two specifications, indicating that larger countries are in 
fact more likely to adopt plurality, as was predicted. 
Another way of measuring the type of electoral system is with the effective threshold, 
which measures how many votes a party needs to secure representation. The higher the effective 
threshold, the more votes are needed and hence the higher are the barriers to entry. Table 5, then, 
presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 include colonial origin dummies, whereas columns 3 and 4 
add legal origin dummies as controls. Here it is found that greater corruption increases the 
effective threshold, and is strongly significant across all specifications. This supports previous 
results, as an increase in the effective threshold translates into a decrease in the degree of 
proportionality or a movement towards plurality. This time, the effect of the log of real GDP per 
capita is significant across nearly all specifications, suggesting that countries with higher income 
are more likely to have a more proportional system. Socialist legal origin is found to reduce the 
degree of proportionality, but only in one specification.  
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the effect of corruption on the choice of district 
magnitude. Once again, columns 1 and 2 include colonial origin dummies as controls, whereas 
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columns 3 and 4 add legal origin dummies instead. In no specification, however, is the impact of 
corruption significant. Higher log of real GDP per capita increase average district size, but only 
in column 3. Similarly, British colonial origin is associated with smaller district sizes, though 
only in column 1.  
 
4.2. Democratizing Countries that Adopted an Electoral System 
Including countries that did not democratize during the period may create a bias in the 
results, as it is not clear what motivated these countries to suddenly adopt an electoral rule. 
Restricting attention, then, only to countries that democratized during this period, and hence 
selected an electoral system for that reason, circumvents this problem, so long as the decision to 
democratize is exogenous. There is no obvious reason, however, as to why the decision to 
democratize should depend on the level of corruption. Furthermore, using a similar sample of 
countries and data, Tavares (forthcoming) undertakes different tests to determine whether there 
are systematic differences in the determinants of corruption between countries that reformed and 
those that did not reform. She finds no statistical difference between the two groups, thus 
providing evidence that democratizations are in fact exogenous and hence can be used as a quasi-
experiment to determine the impact of corruption on the choice of electoral rules. 
Table 7 then presents the ordered probit estimates when the dependent variable 
distinguishes between plurality, PR and mixed.16 Columns 1 and 2 include colonial origin 
dummies as controls, whereas columns 3 include the legal origin dummies. 17 The results, 
however, are unchanged. More corrupt countries still seem more likely to adopt a plurality 
system regardless of specification. The marginal effect of an increase in corruption is to reduce 
                                                
16 I do not present MNL results in this case because the model would not converge. 
17 No results are presented with both the legal origin dummies and the regional dummies because the model would 
not converge. 
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the probability of a PR or a mixed system, but to raise the likelihood of selecting plurality. The 
log of real GDP per capita decrease the probability of adopting plurality, meaning that more 
economically developed countries adopt more proportional systems, whereas British colonial 
origin, as well as British legal origin, increases the likelihood of adopting plurality.  
These conclusions are also unchanged when the dependent variable is measured as the 
effective threshold, as indicated in Table 8. Here higher corruption is still found to be associated 
with less proportionality. Furthermore, the log of real GDP per capita is still negatively 
correlated with the effective threshold. In addition, being a former British or French colony 
translates into a higher effective threshold.  
Examining the effect of corruption on district magnitude, Table 9 shows that the impact 
of corruption is still insignificant. On the other hand, both socialist legal origin and country size, 
as measured by the log of population, are associated with larger district sizes. 
 
 4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
As further robustness checks, in Tables 10, 11, and 12, the dependent variable is 
constructed using data from Golder (2005), rather than DPI2004 . Table 10 presents the ordered 
probit results, classifying the electoral system as PR, mixed, or plurality.18 Table 11 uses the 
effective threshold, while Table 12 estimates the effect of corruption on average district size. The 
results are unchanged in that higher initial corruption is still associated with choosing plurality 
systems in all cases. In Table 10, columns 1-4 examine the sample with both autocratic and 
countries that democratized during the period; columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample solely to 
countries that democratized.19 Furthermore, columns 1, 2, and 5 include colonial dummies, 
                                                
18 Again, no results are shown for the MNL regressions because the models would not converge. 
19 No results are reported in the smaller sample with regional dummies because the models would not converge. 
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whereas columns 3, 4, and 6 add legal origin dummies as controls. Results again indicate that the 
higher the initial level of corruption, the greater the likelihood of adopting a plurality system. 
French colonial origin is also associated with a higher probability of selecting plurality, as is 
country size and socialist legal origin. When the sample is restricted to countries that 
democratized, it is also found that British colonial origin increases the probability of adopting 
plurality. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization seems now to reduce the likelihood of plurality rule, 
but it is robust only in two specifications.  
Table 11 measures the electoral system using the effective threshold. Columns 1-4 
include both autocratic and democratic countries, while columns 5-8 examines only countries 
that democratized. In addition, columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 include colonial dummies, whereas 
columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 add legal origin dummies as controls. The effect of initial corruption is 
unchanged, in that higher corruption levels lead to higher effective thresholds, and hence less 
proportional systems. Larger countries are also associated with less proportional systems, though 
this result is not as robust when the sample size is restricted in columns 5-6. Furthermore, 
Socialist legal origin also increases the effective threshold, though only when regional dummies 
are included.  
Finally, Table 12 presents the estimates of the effect of initial corruption on subsequent 
district magnitude. As in Table 11, columns 1-4 include both autocratic and democratic 
countries, while columns 5-8 examines only countries that democratized. Also, columns 1, 2, 5, 
and 6 include colonial dummies, whereas columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 add legal origin dummies as 
controls. Once again, corruption is found to have impact on the size of districts. In fact, the only 
significant variable is the log of population, which results in smaller district sizes. Its effect, 
however, is mostly insignificant when the sample size is reduced. 
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Overall, the results do suggest that there is a relationship between the degree of 
corruption in a country and the choice of electoral rules. Countries where corruption is more 
widespread appear more likely to choose a plurality system than PR or mixed, despite the fact 
that under plurality rule, politicians are directly held accountable to voters, while under PR 
systems, they are less accountable. This could suggest that these countries are selecting their 
electoral system so as to combat corruption. However, as Aghion et al. (2004) and Myerson 
(1993) argue, plurality systems are also more insulated, so more corrupt regimes may prefer to 
keep the barriers to entry high so as to reduce competition, rather than having it harder to be held 
accountable. This means that their motives for selecting plurality could also be to maximize 
opportunities for corruption. 
The results provide no definite answer as to the motive. However, as seen on Table 1, 
which shows the corruption perception index by electoral system in 2001, countries with a 
plurality system remained the most corrupt on average. In fact, corruption on average seemed to 
have remained the same in countries with plurality rule, while in countries with a PR system it 
decreased. This provides some suggestion that the reason why countries where corruption was 
more widespread selected a plurality system was because it allowed them to continue enjoying 
rents from corruption. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Recent studies have begun to address the issue of how the choice of electoral system 
influences the degree of perceived corruption in a country. But if the type of electoral system 
affects corruption, then electoral rules could be strategically chosen to maximize opportunities 
for corruption. This paper, then, asked whether more corrupt countries are more likely to adopt 
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proportional or plurality systems. Proportional systems have been found to be more corrupt, as it 
is harder to punish politicians. However, plurality systems and small district magnitudes have 
higher barriers to entry, which allows for corruption profits, something not possible under 
proportional representation. It is hence theoretically unclear what type of electoral rule countries 
that are more corrupt would adopt. 
Using the recent wave of democratization and the adoption of electoral systems to 
analyze the choice of electoral rules, this paper found that more corrupt countries are more likely 
to adopt a plurality system than less corrupt ones, which supports the barriers-to-entry argument. 
These findings were robust to various specifications and the use of a different dataset on 
electoral systems. Corruption, however, seems to have no effect on the size of districts. It is 
clear, then, that how corrupt a country is at the time it is selecting its electoral rules does in fact 
affect what system is ultimately adopted, meaning that electoral rules are endogenous. Given the 
adverse effects corruption has on a country’s development, taking it into account when 
examining the choice of institutions is important in helping devise more effective development 
strategies. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
PR Mixed 
Initial Corruption 18 3.056 0.924 2 5 11 3.455 0.820 2 4 
Final Corruption 18 2.589 1.021 0.600 4 9 3.444 1.014 2 5 
ELF 18 0.497 0.231 0.107 0.897 11 0.437 0.247 0.064 0.871 
Log of Population 18 15.507 1.119 12.996 17.443 11 16.004 1.244 14.931 18.792 
Log of GDP per capita 18 0.359 1.156 -1.912 2.080 11 0.103 0.919 -1.062 1.504 
British Colonial Origin 18 0.056 0.236 0 1 11 0 0 0 0 
French Colonial Origin 18 0.056 0.236 0 1 11 0.182 0.405 0 1 
British Legal Origin 18 0.167 0.383 0 1 11 0 0 0 0 
Socialist Legal Origin 18 0.389 0.502 0 1 11 0.818 0.405 0 1 
Plurality  
Initial Corruption 21 4.111 1.050 2 6      
Final Corruption 17 4.112 0.652 3 5      
ELF 21 0.544 0.301 0.011 0.922      
Log of Population 21 16.620 1.338 14.093 18.713      
Log of GDP per capita 21 -0.675 0.928 -2.270 1.200      
British Colonial Origin 21 0.286 0.463 0 1      
French Colonial Origin 21 0.333 0.483 0 1      
British Legal Origin 21 0.286 0.463 0 1      
Socialist Legal Origin 21 0.286 0.463 0 1      
Note: ELF denotes ethonolinguistic fractionalization. Initial corruption is the ICRG corruption perception index 
from 1984, while final corruption is the ICRG corruption perception index from 2001. 
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 Table 2: Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 0.668*** 0.570** 0.744*** 0.984*** 
 (0.239) (0.235) (0.269) (0.376) 
ELF -0.263 0.411 -0.425 0.734 
 (0.845) (1.180) (1.008) (1.199) 
Log Population 0.178 0.241 0.184 0.308 
 (0.187) (0.219) (0.186) (0.260) 
Log GDP per capita -0.216 0.017 -0.423* -0.071 
 (0.272) (0.320) (0.229) (0.299) 
British Colonial Origin 1.398* 1.176   
 (0.793) (0.807)   
French Colonial Origin 1.309** 1.263*   
 (0.607) (0.656)   
British Legal Origin   -0.538 -1.391 
   (0.675) (0.887) 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.684 -2.078** 
   (0.583) (0.857) 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes 
Observations 50 50 50 50 
Log Likelihood -21.0226 -19.0240 -23.7683 -19.1034 
Pseudo-R squared 0.3820 0.4407 0.3012 0.4384 
% correctly predicted 80.00 86.00 80.00 84.00 
Marginal Effects     
Corruption 0.261 0.214 0.290 0.370 
ELF -0.103 0.154 -0.166 0.277 
Log Population 0.069 0.090 0.072 0.116 
Log GDP per capita -0.084 0.006 -0.165 -0.027 
British Colonial Origin 0.498 0.442   
French Colonial Origin 0.481 0.472   
British Legal Origin   -0.197 -0.395 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.259 -0.651 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985. Columns are probit regressions measuring the probability of 
having a plurality system over PR or mixed in 2002.  
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Table 3: Plurality vs. Mixed vs. PR, Multinomial Logit Results 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Mixed Plurality Mixed Plurality Mixed Plurality Mixed Plurality 
Corruption 1.309*** 2.126*** 0.950* 1.652** 0.796 1.778*** 1.507** 2.476** 
 (0.506) (0.739) (0.549) (0.657) (0.617) (0.666) (0.769) (1.164) 
ELF -4.963* -4.448 -1.738 -0.387 -0.736 -1.250 -3.164 0.119 
 (2.824) (2.844) (4.171) (3.853) (2.877) (2.052) (4.977) (3.595) 
Log Population 0.579 0.707 1.103 1.452 0.667* 0.706* 1.295 1.673 
 (0.387) (0.458) (0.794) (0.966) (0.388) (0.409) (1.134) (1.288) 
Log GDP per capita -0.457 -0.673 0.333 0.530 -0.599 -0.937** 0.621 0.456 
 (0.545) (0.715) (0.921) (1.047) (0.494) (0.476) (1.129) (0.929) 
British Colonial Origin -33.68*** 1.844 -35.98*** 0.307     
 (1.554) (1.999) (1.487) (1.872)     
French Colonial Origin 2.491 4.115** 2.051 3.520*     
 (1.629) (1.834) (1.492) (1.834)     
British Legal Origin     -36.89*** -2.228 -46.96*** -4.672* 
     (1.368) (1.509) (2.206) (2.560) 
Socialist Legal Origin     1.970** -0.344 38.313* 16.288 
     (0.936) (1.365) (21.110) (10.267) 
Regional dummies?   Yes    Yes  
Observations 50  50  50  50  
Log Likelihood -35.3914  -29.4404  -36.3752  -25.8930  
Pseudo-R squared 0.3355  0.4473  0.3171  0.5139  
% correctly predicted 68.00  76.00  68.00  78.00  
Note: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country. Reference category is PR. * denotes significance 
at the 10% level; ** at the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and 
Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 4: Plurality vs. PR vs. Mixed, Ordered Probit Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 0.753*** 0.619*** 0.685*** 0.884*** 
 (0.224) (0.218) (0.198) (0.252) 
ELF -1.260 -0.627 -0.613 -1.008 
 (0.905) (1.112) (0.869) (1.210) 
Log Population 0.223 0.303* 0.234 0.341* 
 (0.141) (0.174) (0.143) (0.199) 
Log GDP per capita -0.246 0.040 -0.468** 0.008 
 (0.231) (0.296) (0.201) (0.293) 
British Colonial Origin 1.188 0.978   
 (0.893) (0.941)   
French Colonial Origin 1.489** 1.397**   
 (0.591) (0.639)   
British Legal Origin   -0.609 -1.430* 
   (0.656) (0.738) 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.118 -1.234 
   (0.506) (0.763) 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes 
Observations 50 50 50 50 
Log Likelihood -37.7706 -33.6305 -41.5619 -34.2578 
Pseudo-R squared 0.2909 0.3686 0.2197 0.3568 
% correctly predicted 64.00 68.00 60.00 68.00 
Marginal effects     
PR     
Corruption -0.237 -0.204 -0.235 -0.286 
ELF 0.397 0.207 0.210 0.327 
Log Population -0.070 -0.100 -0.080 -0.111 
Log GDP per capita 0.077 -0.013 0.161 -0.003 
British Colonial Origin -0.258 -0.244   
French Colonial Origin -0.319 -0.327   
British Legal Origin   0.225 0.518 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.041 0.401 
Mixed     
Corruption -0.058 -0.024 -0.031 -0.043 
ELF 0.097 0.025 0.028 0.049 
Log Population -0.017 -0.012 -0.011 -0.017 
Log GDP per capita 0.019 -0.002 0.021 0.000 
British Colonial Origin -0.178 -0.131   
French Colonial Origin -0.209 -0.188   
British Legal Origin   -0.006 -0.123 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.005 0.024 
Plurality     
Corruption 0.295 0.229 0.266 0.329 
ELF -0.495 -0.232 -0.238 -0.376 
Log Population 0.088 0.112 0.091 0.127 
Log GDP per capita -0.096 0.015 -0.182 0.003 
British Colonial Origin 0.436 0.375   
French Colonial Origin 0.528 0.515   
British Legal Origin   -0.219 -0.394 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.046 -0.425 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985. Columns are ordered probit regressions. Dependent variable 
is 0 if the electoral system in 2002 was PR; 1 if mixed; and 2 if plurality.  
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Table 5: Effective Threshold Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 4.561** 3.411 4.872*** 3.515* 
 (1.749) (2.208) (1.646) (1.982) 
 
ELF -2.077 0.015 2.211 -0.635 
 (8.624) (9.375) (8.268) (8.409) 
 
Log Population 1.087 1.271 1.791 2.635 
 (1.760) (1.452) (1.923) (1.647) 
 
Log GDP per capita -5.777** -4.077 -6.212*** -4.051* 
 (2.365) (2.650) (2.247) (2.334) 
 
British Colonial Origin 2.987 2.599   
 (6.052) (7.858)   
 
French Colonial Origin -2.385 -3.864   
 (5.927) (7.327)   
 
French Legal Origin   -2.907 0.446 
   (5.512) (6.756) 
 
Socialist Legal Origin   3.392 18.071** 
   (4.649) (6.763) 
 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes 
Observations 48 48 48 48 
R-squared 0.3823 0.4526 0.3886 0.5295 
Log Likelihood -187.9325 -185.0341 -187.6889 -181.4000 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985.  
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 Table 6: Average District Magnitude Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption -2.706 0.953 -4.055 0.451 
 (4.545) (4.423) (4.587) (4.711) 
 
ELF 14.553 6.579 12.591 2.829 
 (15.362) (21.365) (13.036) (16.075) 
 
Log Population 6.554 6.199 5.808 4.741 
 (5.997) (4.663) (5.859) (5.183) 
 
Log GDP per capita 9.734 7.093 9.477* 7.545 
 (6.199) (7.381) (5.554) (7.493) 
 
British Colonial Origin -18.976* -20.178   
 (10.380) (12.145)   
 
French Colonial Origin -3.669 -0.638   
 (8.642) (11.038)   
 
French Legal Origin   11.104 -0.056 
   (14.446) (14.058) 
 
Socialist Legal Origin   17.703 -3.856 
   (11.465) (7.291) 
 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes 
Observations 48 48 48 48 
R-squared 0.1288 0.2971 0.1507 0.2664 
Log Likelihood -234.1615 -229.0075 -233.5495 -230.0359 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985.  
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Table 7: Democratic Sample, Plurality vs. PR vs. Mixed, Ordered Probit Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corruption 0.545** 0.573* 0.483** 
 (0.231) (0.313) (0.209) 
ELF -1.400 -1.367 -0.666 
 (1.266) (1.412) (1.247) 
Log Population 0.179 0.218 0.230 
 (0.193) (0.199) (0.177) 
Log GDP per capita -0.529* -0.454 -0.651** 
 (0.282) (0.448) (0.284) 
British Colonial Origin 8.822*** 9.596***  
 (0.837) (1.217)  
French Colonial Origin 1.247 1.532  
 (0.793) (1.001)  
British Legal Origin   9.228*** 
   (0.650) 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.643 
   (0.527) 
Regional dummies?  Yes  
Observations 29 29 29 
Log Likelihood -19.3870 -17.1910 -19.5347 
Pseudo R2 0.3753 0.4461 0.3706 
% correctly predicted 79.31 75.86 72.41 
Marginal Effects    
PR    
Corruption -0.112 -0.120 -0.067 
ELF 0.287 0.287 0.092 
Log Population -0.037 -0.046 -0.032 
Log GDP per capita 0.109 0.095 0.091 
British Colonial Origin -0.405 -0.444  
French Colonial Origin -0.133 -0.147  
British Legal Origin   -0.429 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.092 
Mixed    
Corruption -0.104 -0.098 -0.123 
ELF 0.266 0.234 0.169 
Log Population -0.034 -0.037 -0.058 
Log GDP per capita 0.101 0.078 0.166 
British Colonial Origin -0.447 -0.457  
French Colonial Origin -0.302 -0.380  
British Legal Origin   -0.437 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.157 
Plurality    
Corruption 0.216 0.219 0.190 
ELF -0.554 -0.522 -0.262 
Log Population 0.071 0.083 0.090 
Log GDP per capita -0.209 -0.173 -0.256 
British Colonial Origin 0.852 0.902  
French Colonial Origin 0.435 0.527  
British Legal Origin   0.866 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.249 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985. Columns are ordered probit regressions. Dependent variable 
is 0 if the electoral system in 2002 was PR; 1 if mixed; and 2 if plurality.  
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Table 8: Democratic Sample, Effective Threshold  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption 3.664** 1.867 3.708** 4.501* 
 (1.705) (2.691) (1.739) (2.278) 
 
ELF -1.931 -2.254 -1.278 -7.095 
 (6.550) (7.069) (6.583) (8.965) 
 
Log Population 0.359 -0.292 -1.127 -1.046 
 (1.951) (1.270) (1.536) (1.411) 
 
Log GDP per capita -5.321* -0.063 -4.845 1.256 
 (2.760) (2.713) (2.867) (2.665) 
 
British Colonial Origin 13.128* 14.886   
 (6.603) (16.059)   
 
French Colonial Origin 14.297*** 15.716   
 (4.948) (10.755)   
 
French Legal Origin   7.915 2.546 
   (6.112) (9.541) 
 
Socialist Legal Origin   -8.661 -0.028 
   (5.232) (9.608) 
 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes 
Observations 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.5982 0.7824 0.5837 0.7398 
Log Likelihood -106.1496 -97.2560 -106.6617 -99.8474 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985.  
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 Table 9: Democratic Sample, Average District Magnitude 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corruption -2.867 -5.322 -2.060 -0.270 
 (6.350) (11.957) (6.379) (8.661) 
 
ELF -5.794 14.699 6.988 12.412 
 (23.536) (25.098) (18.342) (18.063) 
 
Log Population 9.428 13.584** 16.675*** 18.201*** 
 (7.965) (5.478) (4.890) (3.866) 
 
Log GDP per capita 9.778 -7.642 3.345 -8.394 
 (8.391) (12.575) (6.781) (10.738) 
 
British Colonial Origin -19.822 1.043   
 (18.817) (38.071)   
 
French Colonial Origin -16.565 9.502   
 (11.475) (24.342)   
 
French Legal Origin   -20.579 -12.504 
   (16.863) (18.011) 
 
Socialist Legal Origin   50.333*** 61.443*** 
   (15.895) (20.855) 
 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes 
Observations 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.1543 0.4260 0.3890 0.4873 
Log Likelihood -145.5868 -139.9664 -140.8723 -138.3300 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985.  
 
 34 
Table 10: Golder Dataset, Plurality vs. PR and Mixed, Ordered Probit Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Autocratic and Democratic countries Democratic Countries 
Corruption 0.440** 0.558*** 0.659*** 0.762*** 0.678*** 0.842*** 
 (0.210) (0.212) (0.213) (0.221) (0.217) (0.284) 
ELF -0.867 -1.519 -1.269 -1.993** -1.225 -2.656** 
 (0.877) (0.995) (0.837) (0.931) (0.819) (1.132) 
Log Population 0.278* 0.270* 0.238 0.335** 0.227 0.086 
 (0.146) (0.151) (0.154) (0.152) (0.153) (0.165) 
Log GDP per capita -0.222 -0.137 -0.362 -0.190 -0.335 -0.148 
 (0.286) (0.322) (0.285) (0.338) (0.291) (0.383) 
British Colonial Origin 0.571 0.135   2.990**  
 (0.699) (0.626)   (1.329)  
French Colonial Origin 9.874*** 8.579***   10.811***  
 (0.648) (0.795)   (0.946)  
British Legal Origin   0.857 0.409  1.650 
   (0.711) (0.875)  (1.299) 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.483 1.582**  -0.212 
   (0.433) (0.756)  (0.442) 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes   
Observations 39 39 39 39 30 30 
Log Likelihood -25.6695 -24.5377 -27.1847 -24.9395 -17.3753 -20.9991 
Pseudo R2 0.3164 0.3466 0.2761 0.3359 0.4274 0.3079 
% correctly predicted 62.50 62.50 62.50 65 77.42 67.74 
Marginal Effects       
PR       
Corruption -0.164 -0.208 -0.262 -0.304 -0.283 -0.330 
ELF 0.323 0.566 0.505 0.795 1.020 1.041 
Log Population -0.103 -0.101 -0.095 -0.133 -0.063 -0.034 
Log GDP per capita 0.083 0.051 0.144 0.076 -0.067 0.058 
British Colonial Origin -0.192 -0.049   -0.309  
French Colonial Origin -0.553 -0.528   -0.469  
British Legal Origin   -0.327 -0.161  -0.460 
Socialist Legal Origin   -0.191 -0.568  0.083 
Mixed       
Corruption 0.091 0.134 0.193 0.247 0.094 0.196 
ELF -0.180 -0.364 -0.372 -0.647 -0.337 -0.617 
Log Population 0.058 0.065 0.070 0.109 0.021 0.020 
Log GDP per capita -0.046 -0.033 -0.106 -0.062 0.022 -0.034 
British Colonial Origin 0.071 0.030   -0.556  
French Colonial Origin -0.414 -0.445   -0.503  
British Legal Origin   0.192 0.123  -0.013 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.136 0.390  -0.049 
Plurality       
Corruption 0.073 0.074 0.069 0.057 0.190 0.134 
ELF -0.143 -0.202 -0.133 -0.148 -0.683 -0.424 
Log Population 0.046 0.036 0.025 0.025 0.042 0.014 
Log GDP per capita -0.037 -0.018 -0.038 -0.014 0.045 -0.024 
British Colonial Origin 0.121 0.019   0.865  
French Colonial Origin 0.967 0.973   0.973  
British Legal Origin   0.135 0.038  0.473 
Socialist Legal Origin   0.055 0.178  -0.034 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5 % level; 
and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. ELF denotes ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization in 1985. Dependent variable is 0 if the electoral system in 2002 was PR; 1 if mixed; and 2 if plurality.  
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Table 11: Golder Dataset, Effective Threshold  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Autocratic and Democratic Countries Democratic Countries 
Corruption 5.159*** 5.552** 5.032*** 6.086*** 5.369* 6.309 4.855* 5.598* 
 (1.736) (2.271) (1.778) (2.121) (2.880) (4.559) (2.696) (3.082) 
 
ELF -7.374 -10.701 -6.235 -7.795 -19.029* -23.569 -16.319 -17.047 
 (8.076) (12.525) (8.114) (10.538) (10.373) (18.369) (9.896) (12.679) 
 
Log Population 3.152* 2.999 3.332** 4.584*** 3.130 2.526 2.553 3.872* 
 (1.640) (1.770) (1.499) (1.332) (2.071) (2.185) (2.084) (2.175) 
 
Log GDP per capita 0.690 1.554 0.475 3.161 1.980 3.527 1.842 3.748 
 (3.419) (3.893) (3.300) (3.605) (4.112) (5.493) (4.512) (5.467) 
 
British Colonial Origin -3.055 -5.302   11.073 -1.963   
 (6.645) (6.411)   (11.213) (18.112)   
 
French Colonial Origin -0.175 -3.055   2.467 -7.758   
 (6.334) (8.673)   (7.163) (18.041)   
 
French Legal Origin   -2.632 0.520   4.557 0.856 
   (5.601) (8.156)   (9.828) (7.539) 
 
Socialist Legal Origin   1.627 28.820***   -3.615 20.538* 
   (5.191) (10.329)   (5.799) (10.909) 
 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 39 39 39 39 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.2788 0.2928 0.2823 0.4064 0.2896 0.3233 0.2761 0.3531 
Log Likelihood -154.4682 -154.0864 -154.3713 -150.6717 -118.9083 -118.1796 -119.1911 -117.5042 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985.  
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Table 12: Golder Dataset, Average District Magnitude  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Autocratic and Democratic Countries Democratic Countries 
Corruption -8.005 -5.136 -6.749 -7.001 -9.210 -13.665 -9.759 -10.940 
 (4.822) (5.680) (4.593) (5.341) (8.155) (12.863) (7.529) (8.785) 
 
ELF 6.905 -4.562 9.037 1.928 4.432 24.793 11.264 12.890 
 (12.670) (14.817) (11.405) (14.114) (14.520) (25.478) (14.899) (19.740) 
 
Log Population -4.918* -5.082* -3.901* -5.399** -5.837 -3.758 -3.589 -5.610* 
 (2.785) (2.538) (2.169) (2.571) (3.690) (2.921) (2.619) (3.183) 
 
Log GDP per capita -6.033 -8.152 -4.958 -8.069 -8.990 -13.549 -10.100 -13.424 
 (5.597) (8.091) (6.044) (8.543) (7.502) (12.679) (8.406) (12.144) 
 
British Colonial Origin -3.937 -7.211   0.309 53.894   
 (10.581) (10.293)   (20.114) (39.296)   
 
French Colonial Origin -6.867 -16.694   -10.492 33.282   
 (13.078) (21.096)   (18.341) (45.388)   
 
French Legal Origin   12.174 2.792   8.197 14.893 
   (9.702) (13.624)   (14.872) (11.544) 
 
Socialist Legal Origin   14.686 -19.152   18.242 -18.967 
   (10.471) (12.472)   (12.559) (15.698) 
 
Regional dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 39 39 39 39 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.1233 0.2127 0.1642 0.2192 0.1398 0.2306 0.1828 0.2238 
Log Likelihood -186.2584 -184.1599 -185.3257 -183.9986 -145.1761 -143.5020 -144.4059 -143.6349 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 
the 5 % level; and *** at the 1 % level. Regional dummies are for Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. 
ELF denotes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985.  
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Appendix Table 1: Countries Without Electoral System in 1984 
Albania* Haiti* Slovak Republic* 
Argentina* Jordan Slovenia* 
Armenia* Kazakhstan Sri Lanka 
Azerbaijan Kyrgyz Republic Sudan 
Bangladesh* Latvia* Suriname 
Bulgaria* Lebanon Syria 
Burkina Faso Liberia Tajikistan 
Chile* Lithuania* Tanzania* 
Croatia* Macedonia* Togo* 
Czech Republic* Madagascar* Turkmenistan 
Estonia* Moldova* Uganda 
Ethiopia* Mozambique* Ukraine* 
Gabon Namibia Uruguay* 
Georgia* Nicaragua* Uzbekistan 
Ghana* Nigeria* Vietnam 
Guatemala* Philippines* Yemen, Rep. 
Guinea Russian Federation*  
Note: * denotes countries that democratized as well. All countries started with no electoral system only to adopt one 
during the period 1984-2004. Sample of countries is based on the DPI2004 dataset. 
